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historians. H~ is the coauthor of, among other works, Federal
Courts in the 21st Century, and has written extensively about the
history of the Federal judiciary.
Like the other witnesses, your entire statement is read into the
record and you may procee<l as you wish, Professor.
STATEMENT OF MARK TUSHNET, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASIHNGTON, D.C.

Mr. TuSHNET. Thank you, Senator Schumer. I want to thank you
and your Subcommittee for inviting me to testify on the important
question we are discussing today.
I am going to begin with some general comments about whether
nominees must show that they are particularly qualified for the appointment or whether, in contrast, those who oPP2se the nomination must show that the nominees are not qualIfied. My written
comments tum to the relevance of political experience to appointment to the Federal courts. I won't ¥o through those points orally,
but would be happy to discuss them In the question period.
It seems to me that constitutional principle shows that nominations come to the Senate essentially 1D equipoise because th~ considerations relevant to a burden of persuasion are basically in balance. That conclusion, it seems to me, is supported by the most
basic aspects of our system of separation of powers, famously described by Madison in the 51st Federal Paper as one in which ambition counters ambition; that ist the separation of powers system
works best when each branch-nere, the President and the Senate-take positions that each calculates independently will serve
the American people best.
.
In the context of judicial nominations, the process of ambition
countering ambition works in this way: the nominee and his or her
supporters can point out that the nomination was made by a President. Now, we have heard talk about deference to the President,
but the ques.tion really is what is the reason, if any, for the exist'ance of some presumption or deference.
It is not simp'ly the position the President occupies. Rather, deference arises, if it does because the President presumptively has
the support of the peopie of the United States as a whole, having
been chosen by a m~ority of them. In response, Senators can reasonably respond that they too were chosen by the m~ority of the
American people, taken as a whole, organized somewhat dif·
ferently. Indeed, I think there are a couple of considerations that
make the Senators' claims somewhat stronger, although the distribution matters a bit.,
The President was chosen by a majority of the American people
in a single election, capturing the people's views at a moment. in
time, while Senators were chosen in a series of elections that,
taken together, might better capture the more enduring values of
the American people. And in tliat connection, questiOns of timing
may matter as well. The more remote the PreSIdential election is,
the more powerful is the Senate's claim to represent the people as
of the time of nomination.
Now, the historical record is unsurprisingly suh).ect to varying interpretations. One historian describes the Senate s role as reactive,
responding to the initiative taken by the President in selecting a
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nominee. In this connection, there is a particular problem in assessing history which I would put under the heading of "divided
government," a relatively' recent phenomenon as a sort of permanent feature of our constItutional system.
When the Senate and the President are in the same party, it is
not surprising that the Senate would engage in a relatively limited
inquiry and that the criteria articulated would be relatively limited. After all, there is going to be relatively little disagreement between the nominating President and a majority of the Senate
where there is this sort of unified control.
I think that Senator Schumer's concern about the under-thetable problem arises in connection with divided Government, when
the President and a majority of the Senate are from different parties. It is at that point that controversy arises, and I take the effort
here to be one to make sure that the nature of the controversy be
brought out into the open rather than concealed by some other inquiries that might be undertaken.
This historian I quoted, Dean Raymond Solomon, describes the
history as one in which politics, policy and professionalism all play
a role. Policy concerns, he says, dominate when Presidents attempt
to transform governmental structures or policies ~d perceive the
Court as a necessary aUy in accomplishing that agenda.
Controversy has arisen when Presidents made selections based
on concerns thnt the Senate didn't share, whether the disagreement was over a policy course the President sought to set through
the nominations or over the patronage-type politics the President
pursued in selecting a nominee.
My own take on this complex history would be that, in general,
opponents of nominations have never thought that the mere fact of
nomination carried with it any special presumption in favor of the
nomination. Nomination contests have focused on whatever seemed
relevant at the time: the nominee's ideology, the nominee's performance in executive office pursuing policies with which the Senate didn't agree, whether the nomination would have particularly
dramatic effects on the overall direction of the Court, the nominee's
background. All of this has been fair game, and it seems to me that
is precisely the way the system of ambition countering ambition
should work.
I want to close with two comments. The first is the obsen!ation
that has been made earlier today about the inaccuracy ~'jf predictions about the course the nominees will pursue once apl-lOinted.
Here, there is a line-I may not quote it exactly -from Ecclesiastes:
the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong. It
was amended by either H.L. Mencken or Damon Runyon, but that
is the way to bet; that is, chances are you are going to get what
you expect to get.
The second point relates to the concern about an intrusive or extensive nomination prooooQ and its effects on attracting people to
the positions for which the~' might be nominated. Here, I want to
refer to a dinner conversatIon I had nearly 30 years ago with the
first judge I worked for, George Edwards, in Detroit.
At the end of roy term of service with him as a law clerk, we
went out to dinner and during the course of that dinner he said
. something that I have never forgotten, which is, reflecting on his
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career, he said we should always remember that it is a privilege

to have the opportunity to serve the American people. I think that
a nominee who does not regard the opportunity to serve as a real
privilege is one about whom we ought to have questions.

Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tushnet follows:]
STATEMENT OF

MARK TuSHNE"!',

CARMACK WATERHOUSE PROFESSOR OF

CONBTITtTMONAL LAw. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAw CENTER

I want to thank Senator Schumer and the subcommittee for inviting me to testify
on the important question of the criteria Senators should use in detennining whether to vote in favor of a proposed appointment to the federal courts, and especially
the Supreme Court. My observations are infonned by historical experience and, I
believe, constitutional principle. I begin with some general comments about whether
. nominees must show that they are particularly qualified for the appointment or
whether, in contrast, those who oppose the nomination must show that the nominees are not qualified.
My comments then tum to the relevance of »C?litical experience to appointment
to the federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court. In my brief comments I will
provide some snapshots from history, which indicate that many Supreme Court justices, including some of the most celebrated, have had substantial experience at the
national politiCal level. 1 After giving these snapshots, I win explain why I think that
such experience is an important asset that a person can tiring to the Supreme
Court. I do not a~e, of course, that only J)('Ople with such experience should be
appointed to the Court, but rather that the Court serves us best when it contains
a mixture of people with different backgrounds, and among those backgrounds
should be some with substantial national political experience.
I believe that constitutional principle shows that nominations come to the Senate
essentially in equi~ise, because the considerations relevant to a burden of persuasion are basically m balance. This conclusion seems to me supponeg by tile most
basic aspects of our system of separation of powers, famously described b)' James
Madison in The Federalist 51 as one in whicli ambition counters ambition. That is,
the separation of powers system works best when each branch-here, the President
and tile Senate-take positions that each calculates independently would serve the
American people best.
In the context of judicial nominations, the process of ambition countering ambition works in this way: The nominee and his or her supporters can poin~ out that
the nomination was made by a President who presumptively has the sUp'port of the
people of the United States as a whole, having been chosen by a mlijonty of them.
Senators can reasonably respond that they too were chosen by a mlijority of the
American people taken as a whole. Indeed, they can note that the President was
chosen by a mlijority of the American people in a single election, capturing the pea-I>le's views at a moment in time, while Senators were chosen in a series of elections
that, taken together, might better C8l?ture the more enduring values of the American people. In that connection, questions of timing may matter as well: The more
remote the presidential election is. the more powerful is the Senate's claim to represent the people as of the time of the nomination.
The historic81 record is, unsurprisinllly, subject to varying intervretations. One
historian describes the Senate's role 8S "reactive!" responding to the lDitiative taken
by the President in selecting a nominee. ~ Presiuents always have political allies in
the Senate, who almost always take the position that the nominee is fully qualified
for the ~ition and that, in any event, the President's judgment that the nominee
is qualified deserves some deference. Evidence taken from statements b)' supporters
of a nomination is therefore, in my judgment, less valuable than evidence taken
from s'~tements by a nomination's opponents. In addition, the confirmation of a
nominee has oft.en been something of a foregone concluaion. which makes statements of principle on the question of confirmation some~ of a free shot by supporters and opponents: TIle supporters can structure their comments to lay tile
groundwork for using the confirmation as a precedent, and the opponents can dismiu those statements because they have no effect on the confirmation process.
1 My comments draw in part on Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and
EXJ)8rience, 72 B. U. L. REV. 747 (1992).
:fRayman L. Solomon, "Nominees, Controversial," in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT 596-96 (Kermit L. Hall ed. 1992).
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These considerations lead me to conclude that the most historically informed inquiry would examine hi,hly contested nominations, a much smaller number, of
course, than all nominatiOns. Dean Solomon describes the history 88 one il\ which
"politics, policy. and profe88ionalism" all playa role. He points out that "policy concerna dominate when presidents attempt to transform governmental structures or
()Olicies and perceive the Court as a necessary ally in accomplishing that agenda."
Controversy has arisen when Presidents made selections based on concerns that the
Senate did not share, whether the disagreement was over the policy course the
President sought to set through the nominations or over the patronage-type politics
the President pursued in selecting a nominee. S
I would summarize a complex history by saying that, in general, opponents have
never thought that the mere fact of nomination carried with it any s~al presumption in favor of the nomination. Nomination contests have focused on whatever
seemed relevant at the time. The nominee's ideol()gy, the nominee's performance in
executive office pursuing policies with which the Senate did not a~, whether the
nomination would have particularly dramatic effects on the overall direction of the
court, the nominee's baCkground, whether the President is using the nomination essentially as a patronage appointment or to appeal to some particular interest
B!Oup-all this has been fair game. In my view, that is precisely the way the system
of ambition countering ambition should work.
I tum now to the question of ~litical ex~rience as a qualification tor judicial of·
fice. Consider first the membership of the Supreme Court when it decided Brown
v. Board of Education. The Chief Justice had been Governor of California, the Republican Party's candidate for the vice-presidency in 1948, and a realistic contender
for the presidential nomination in 19152 until DWight Eisenhower entered the race.
Hu~ Black had been a Senator and a leader in promoting some of Franklin R0osevelt's moat important legislative initiatives. William O. DO\!BI88 had been a presidential adviser and chair of ORe of the New Deal's mf!jor adininietrative agencies,
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Stanley Reed had been a state legislator,
general t'Ounsel to an important Depression-era agency, and Solicitor Generil. Felix
FranktiL~.. " had been a close presidential adviser and a ml\ior p'ublic commentator
on the SUi,.-eme Court and the Constitution. Robert Jackson had been Solicitor General and Attorney General. Tom Clark had been a close freeidential adviser and Attorn~ General under H~ S Truman. Even the leas dieti~shed members of
the Brown CoUrt had si . cant national political ~rience: Harold Burton had
been mayor ot Clevelan and a Senator, and Sherman Minton had been a Senator
from Indiana before his 1940 election deteat, after which he W88 appointed to the
tederal court of appeals.
The substantial political e~rience represented on the Brown Court W81 not
unique, or a respon.ee to the Court's ob8tructio~m during the early New Deal, 81
a second snapshot reveals. The Court in the 19208 also had aeveral members with
substantial national political ~rience. The Chief Justic;;eJ William Howard Taft,
had of course- been president of the United States. James McReynolds had been Attorney General. Louis Brandeis had been a lJ!8jor public figure, leaclirul the nation's
consumer movement. Joseph McKenna had been a memlier of the House of Representatives and, briefly, Attorney General. And George Sutherland had been a
leading figure in the United States Senate, after having served in the state legislature and the House of Rep'resentatives.
A third sn~hot incluCles the men who have served 88 Chief Justice. John Jay,
of course, had been an. important diplomat for the new nation and an author of a
handful of The Federaltst Pa~rs. John Marshall had been a Virginia l.lator, an
important legal and political adviser to George Washington a member of the House
ot Representatives, and, briefly, secretary of state. Roger Taney had been, again, a
close adviser to President Andrew JacksOn~ secretary of the treasury and Attorney
General. Salmon Chase was a governor ana Senator, and Lincoln's secreta!')' of the
treasury, and, even while serying on the Court, a persistent ~tential candidate for
the presidency. Edward Douglaaj White served in the Senate for ~.Years before
his appointment 88 Chief Justice. I have already mentioned William Howard Taft.
Taft's auCC8esor Charles Evans Hughes had been Governor of New York for two
terms before his appointment to the Court, and W81 the unsuccessful ReP!lblican
candidate for the presidency in 1916. Betore his reappointment 81 Chief Justice!..
Hughes served as secretary ot state. Fred V'lDson W81 a member of the House or
Representatives, and, after resigning 81 a federal judge, occupied a number of im·
3 For example, the Senate rejected the nomination of Ebenezer Hoar to the Supreme Court
In 1879 becaU88 the President repreaented one aegt!lent of the Republican Party, to which Hoar
adhered .. well, while the m$rity of the Senate formed a different faction in the ..me party
and sought a nominee from that faction.
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~rtant positions in Roosevelt's wartime administration hefore becoming secretary
of the treasury in 1946.
My final snapshot is drawn from a list of justices provided in the first pages of
the constitutional law casebook of which I am a co-author. The list is designe<l, we
sa)" "to offer at least some sense of the background, personality, and intellectual
style of the Justices who have had the greatest impact on modem constitutional
law."4 Omitttng the Court's present members, we describe 29 justices, of whom seventeen, in my Judgment, had substantial political experience, almost all of them on
the national level.
I should note at this point an important gualification. Of course determining
whether someone has had substantial political experience on the national level is
a matter of judgment, and I have no doubt that some of my judgments could be
challenged. In my efforts to count and evaluate, for example, I treat Louis Brandeis
and Thurgood Marshall as people with substantial national political experience even
though neither had occupied elective office before the)' beciune justices, and Brandeis had not held even an appointive national office. But I did not include Lewis
Powell in my list of justices with substantial national political experience, despite
the important positions he held in Virginia's education system during tne early
rears of desegregation and despite the fact that he had been president of the AmerIcan Bar Association. I counted serving, even briefly, as Attornel General as having
national political experience, but what of Justice Byron White s service as Deputy
Attorney General?
The snapshots I have ~ven indicate rather clearly,. I think, that over the course
of U.S. history, substantlru experience in national poritics hal been regarded as an
asset for Supreme Court justices. This is not to say that such experience has been
a pre~uisite for appointment, or that justices with such experience have uniformly'
been better according to any relevant criteria, than justices without it. Bather, It
is to say o~y that the judgment of presidents and Senators appears to be that having a Court with some justices with national political experience is vAluable for the
Court and the nation.
What might explain that judgmen(l I will identifY three reasons, in decreasing
order of im~rtance, for thhikirig that the Supreme Court's quality, and therefore
the quality of constitutional law, is improved when some justices have had sifPillicant national-political experience. Agam, of course, one's view about the quality of
constitutional actiudication depends at least in part on the general understanding
one has about wliat constitutional actiudication is, and each senator will have to asseu what I have to say in light of his or her individual understanding about that

qUTh~o~~t im(H?rtant reason for thinkinJr that substantial national political experience is a valuable attribute of Supreme Court Justices is that an important component of what we want from Supreme Court justices is what Dean Anthonr Kronman
of Yale Law School calls prudence or practical wisdom, precisely because Justices are
called u~n not to articulate principles of justice in tlie abstract but rather to develop pnnciples of justice suitable for regUlating government in the present day,
under real-world conditions.
We can find J)ractical wisdom in many places, o( course, but people with 8ubstan·
. tial national political ex~rience have two characteristics that make them particularly suitable candidates for finding it. First, the! have displayed their capacity to
exercise practical wisdom in their public lives. So, we .imply have a laiger evidentiary base for evaluating a nominee's caJ)acity to exercise practical wisdom when
the nominee has been an important public figure. No doubt backroom advisers and
la~ers in private practice can have practicill wisdom, but only those whom the),
adVise will be able to say with confidence that the nominees are indeed people of
sound practical judgment.
.
Second, an important reason that people become successful public figures over the
long run is that they actually demonstrate their good judgment. Among other
thiiigs, success require8 that political figures liiten well to people with views dif.
ferent from theirs and learn how to respect and to some de~ accommodate those
views without yjelding on what is fundamental to the politiCal actor. Here substantial national political experience does not itself give the ~rson a particular asset,
such as knowl~ about the realities of government that he or she can contribute
to the Court. Rather, successful performance on the national political stage is an
indication that the nominee has tlie valuable character trait of practical wisilom and
judgment that we seek in judges.
A somewhat less important reason for thinking that national political experience .
8hould be regarded as an asset in a judicial nominee fa the sense of reality that pea4 GEOFFREY

STONE ET AL., CONSTI'l'lrrIONAL LAW lni (4 th ed. 2001).
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pIe with such experience can bring to constitutional-acliudication. To the extent that
Supreme Court Justices are developing doctrine aimed at ensuring that the American people are governed as well as we can be within constitutional limits, knowing
how gov.)rnment actuaUy works may be a valuable asset. The usual example given
to support this point is that someone sensitive to the realities of the national legislative process would -not dismiss legislative history as a _guide to interpreting statutes. a Another example might be that of Justice Byron White, the Court's most articulate defender of the proposition that separation-of-powers questions should be
resolved with an appreciation of the way in which members of Congress and members of the executive branch are engaged in long-term interactions. Justice White
based this understanding of the Constitution on his experience as Deputy Attorney
General.
I think it is indeed important that the Supreme Court as an institution have access to this sense of the realities of governing. One problem, however, is that those
realities chanie, and a person appointed in one era might not understand the new
realities. Justice Black, for example, clearly knew what Congress was like in the
late 1930s, but he served through the 1960s, by which time the realit'.:'s of the legislative process had changed dramatically. He could, and did, contribute his sense of
the realities of ~overnance to the Court in the 1940s, but his ability to make such
a contribution dissipated over time. This consideration suggests to me that Senators
should be concerned that they be presented with some regularity with nominees
with substantial national political experience. A long run of nominees without such
experience is, I think, likely to impair the quality of constitutional law.
Finally, in conversations about the contributions people with substantial political
experience can make to constitutional a(ijudication, sometimes I have heard politicians disparaged as people .who are good at the art of compromise but-for that reason-not well suited for developing constitutional r.rinciples. Designing a statute
that accommodates competing interests, it is though , is quite different from articulating a constitutional principle to reiulate some general area like free speech. In
the main, I agree with this position, although I think it fails to appreciate the extent
to which politicians themselves act on principle. Still, I think it worth noting that
the art of compromise is not foreign to the Supreme Court. AJJ with statutes, opinions contain language whose terms are sometimes negotiated among the justices, as
the inspection of the pa~rs of various justices at the Library of Congress reveals.
A person adept of explaming to a recalcitrant colleague why a changr) in language
is desirable and need not impair what the colleague thinks important serves a valuable function on the Court. To the extent that people with substantial political experience bring such talents to the job, all the better. But, of course, those talents are
not unique to people with such experience, so the ability to work out compromises
over doctrinal formulations is the least important asset people with substantial national political experience bring to the Court.
I should be clear that neither my snapshots nor my normative argument establish
that we should have only people with substantial national politic81 e~rience on
the courts. For example, having some grasp of the realities of government is useful!,.
but so is having some grasp of the realities of business, and having some grasp or
the realities of the criminal justice system, and so on. Dift'erent nominees bring different experiences to the courts, and what seems desirable is having a decent mix
of.P8Ople, among whom are some with substantial political experience. 8
To summarize: Historically it has been thought important that some significant
number of Supreme Court justices have substantial experience in national politics.
And there are iood reasons, baaed on what I think is the best understanding of
- what we seek m constitutional a(ijudication, supporting that judgment. In particular, i':ldges with ,uch experience are likely to bnng a sense of reality to constitutional aCijudication, ana, more important, practical wisdom as well.

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Professor. I want to thank all
five witnesses. The testimony was varied, but I think right to the
point, and we appreciate it very much.
II I note, though, that to 80me extent thoee who allJUe qainat reeort to legialative hiltory have
an account of ltatutory meaning baaed on a theory of democratic self·governance according toO'
which the actual operation of the preaent legislative proceu i. irrelevant.
e I think it worth noting 81 well one disadvantage auociated with the nomination of people
with IUbatantial natiOnal~Utic:a1 experience: The Benatora who will conaicier them in the con·
finnation pl'OCleU are Jike to have had pereonal relation. with the nomineel. Such relationl
the Senatol'l' jud8menta, but they alao can diatort thoee judgmenta:
can enhance the quality
nominee who he. been eaay to get along wfth may mittakenly be seen sa wile arid prudent.
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